Multiple different securities law enforcers can pursue U.S. public companies for the same misconduct. These enforcers include a variety of federal agencies, class action attorneys, and derivative litigation attorneys, as well as fifty separate state regulators. Scholars and policy makers have increasingly questioned whether the benefits of this multienforcer approach are worth the costs, or whether a more coordinated and streamlined securities enforcement regime might lead to efficiency gains. How serious are these concerns? And what role do state regulators play in the enforcement mix? Whereas the enforcement efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission and class action lawyers have been well-studied, almost no empirical research has been done on state enforcement.
INTRODUCTION
American public companies frequently complain that they operate in an "overly litigious" business environment. While the litigation risk they face spans a dizzying array of areas, securities litigation risk is often singled out for especially harsh criticism. This is due in part to America's use of multiple securities law enforcers. These enforcers include a variety of federal public and quasi-public bodies (such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)), as well as private class action attorneys, private derivative litigation attorneys, and fifty separate state regulators. Each of these enforcers may act independently of the others, giving rise to the possibility of expensive duplicate litigation and inconsistent enforcement policies. While the intensity of U.S. securities law enforcement likely plays an important role in keeping the cost of capital low for U.S. listed firms, numerous scholars have questioned whether more streamlined enforcement efforts [Vol. 65 POLICING PUBLIC COMPANIES might achieve the same or better results at lower cost. 1 What is missing from this debate is a good sense of the magnitude of the potential problem. How often do U.S. public companies experience litigation generally, and securities litigation specifically? And how often are they targeted by multiple securities law enforcers? Also missing from the debate is a good sense of the enforcement role played by state securities regulators. While the role of federal public enforcement and private class action enforcement of the securities laws has been wellstudied, 2 almost no empirical research has been done on state enforcement. 3 Congress broadly preempted ex ante state regulation of public companies' securities offerings and disclosure documents in the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), but explicitly preserved state authority to bring government enforcement actions against these companies "[for] fraud or deceit, or unlawful conduct by a broker or dealer, in connection with securities or securities transactions." 4 The targeting of public companies by Eliot Spitzer and his REV. 164, 170 (2009) . For an older survey focused on private enforcement, see Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465 REV. , 1468 REV. -1504 REV. (2004 .
3. Some recent empirical work has been done on private enforcement under state law. See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 1, at 53; Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80 U. C1N. L. REV. 349, 349-53 (2012) . Our focus here, however, is on public enforcement by state regulators.
4. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. In 1998, Congress also broadly preempted securities class actions based on state law, with important carve-outs for traditional corporate successors as New York Attorney General has led some to praise and others to criticize NSMIA's "fraud carve-out," as it has come to be known. But beyond anecdotal accounts of New York's high-profile enforcement efforts, we know little about how states have utilized their preserved authority.
This Article responds to these important foundational questions. We examined the fiscal year (FY) 2004 , FY 2005 , and FY 2006 Form 10-Ks filed by every domestic U.S. company that listed common stock on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) at any point in the last decade-a total of 5,441 Form 10-Ks filed by 1,977 different firms. Specifically, we examined the "material litigation" disclosures found in Item 3 of these Form 10-Ks, recording whether the companies disclosed any material litigation and, if so, whether they disclosed securities litigation. If a company disclosed securities litigation, we tracked which of the following four forms of securities litigation it disclosed: a class action; a derivative action; a federal regulatory action or investigation; or a state regulatory action or investigation. We also recorded additional information about the securities-related state enforcement actions and investigations disclosed, such as the identity of the enforcing state, their topic, and whether they overlapped with related federal or private enforcement efforts.
Our findings support the contention that American public companies operate in a highly litigious business environment generally, and that they confront significant enforcement in the securities law area in particular-often at the hands of multiple different enforcers. Of the companies in our dataset, 72% disclosed that they faced some form of material litigation over the course of the three years examined and 27% disclosed some form of securities litigation-with two in every ten disclosing a securities class action. Remarkably, 56% of the companies that disclosed securities litigation reported at least two forms of securities litigation, and 28% reported three or more. Moreover, nearly 40% of companies that disclosed a federal regulatory action or investigation at the hands of the SEC also disclosed that at least one other federal regulator, such as the DOJ, had targeted them. One cannot conclude from these findings that the securities laws are being overly law litigation. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
5. Form 10-K filers are required to disclose any material pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business, to which they, a subsidiary, or their property is subject. See 17 C.F. R. § 229.103 (2012) . We focused on Form 10-Ks filed for the fiscal years [2004] [2005] [2006] because these were the most recent that would disclose mostly completed securities litigation. See, e.g., Jordan Milev, Robert Patton & Svetlana Starykh, enforced, but the findings do suggest that policymakers should consider seriously whether more streamlined enforcement efforts might lead to efficiency gains.
Our findings also illuminate the enforcement role state securities regulators play. Just 8% of the companies in our dataset that disclosed some form of securities litigation disclosed a securities-related state enforcement action or investigation, as compared to 74% for class actions, 48% for derivative actions, and 45% for a federal regulatory action or investigation. Although few in number, the disclosed securities-related state enforcement actions and investigations share several interesting characteristics. They were largely: directed at out-ofstate companies (that is, those neither headquartered nor incorporated in the enforcing state) (68%); targeted at firms in the financial sector (93%); and aimed at misconduct implicating an industry-wide scandal, as opposed to isolated instances of firm-specific misconduct (85%). Moreover, the vast majority involved at least one overlapping investigation or action by another securities law enforcer (93%).
Our findings also reveal important differences in state securities enforcement behavior. A clear majority of the states (thirty-two) were not identified as pursuing any securities enforcement efforts against the public companies in our dataset. Fourteen states were identified as pursuing between one and four distinct enforcement actions or investigations, while four states-New York, West Virginia, Connecticut, and Massachusetts-were responsible for 70% of the total number of state actions and investigations disclosed, each bringing between eight and thirty-one.
There was also a marked difference between the enforcement behavior of states with elected securities regulators and that of states with appointed securities regulators. Whereas 36% of states have an elected securities regulator, these states were responsible for 80% of the matters disclosed. We ran regressions controlling for other variables that might influence a state's level of enforcement activity. Our statistically significant results indicate that states with elected enforcers brought matters at more than four times the rate of states with appointed enforcers. Notably, states with an elected Democrat serving as the securities regulator brought matters at nearly seven times the rate of other states. Our findings thus support the claim that states' pursuit of public companies for securities-related misconduct has a partisan political dimension.
6
This Article represents an important first step in understanding the role state regulators play in policing public companies for securities-6. In the time frame studied, both the SEC and the Presidency were controlled by Republicans. related misconduct. Additional research, both theoretical and empirical, would help answer the key questions this Article brings into focus. For example, is it wise to rely on elected state regulators to supplement the enforcement efforts of the SEC, an agency that was specifically designed to remain insulated from political pressures? And what motivates certain states to police public companies in this area, while the vast majority chooses not to? Better understanding state motivations would help in determining the likely social value of NSMIA's fraud carve-out, and might inform expectations about state enforcement behavior vis-d-vis public companies in other important legal areas.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes our data collection process and offers descriptive statistics on the companies in our dataset. Part II provides descriptive statistics on the litigation disclosed by the companies in our dataset, with a detailed focus on the extent and types of securities litigation experienced. Part III provides background on the role of state securities regulators in policing public companies and offers statistics on the state securities enforcement efforts disclosed by the companies in our dataset, including the results of our regressions. The Article then briefly concludes, highlighting avenues of further research that our dataset open up.
I. OVERVIEW OF DATASET

A. Data Collection Process
One of our primary goals in conducting this research was to find out more about the role that state regulators have played in policing public companies for securities fraud. No one has previously compiled comprehensive information about state securities enforcement efforts targeting this population of firms, and this information is not readily available through state-based sources. We therefore chose to consult the Form 10-K that public companies are required to file with the SEC on an annual basis and which is readily available on the SEC's website. 7 Specifically, Part I, Item 3, of the Form 10-K requires filers to 7. In the time frame examined, a company could become obligated to file a Form 10-K in three ways: (1) if its stock traded on a national securities exchange, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2006); (2) if it had more than $10 million in assets and equity securities held by more than 500 record owners, id. § 78m(); or (3) if it had filed a registration statement with the SEC that had gone effective pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933. Id. § 78o(d). Companies who triggered reporting obligations in the first way could subsequently avoid them by delisting. Companies who triggered them in the second way could subsequently avoid them if the number of owners of their equity securities dropped below 300, or if for three years they consistently had fewer than 500 such owners and fewer than $10 million in assets, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4 (2011). Finally, reporting obligations triggered in the third manner described above could be suspended one year after the offering if (and so long as) the number of owners of the securities to which the registration statement related was below 300, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d).
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escribe briefly any material pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business, to which the registrant or any of its subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their property is subject.", 8 Filers are instructed to provide certain basic information about such proceedings, as well as about "any such proceedings known to be contemplated by governmental authorities." 9 We examined the Item 3 disclosures in the FY 2004 , FY 2005 , and FY 2006 Form 10-Ks filed by U.S. companies that listed common stock on the NYSE at some point in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
10
The NYSE is by far the largest U.S. stock exchange in terms of market capitalization; focusing on firms that listed common stock on that exchange over a ten-year period thus gives us a window into the litigation experiences of a broad set of U.S. public companies." We focused on these firms' disclosed litigation experiences in the fiscal years [2004] [2005] [2006] in order to maximize the likelihood that the litigation would be completed. 12 To identify the companies whose Form 10-Ks we would examine, we consulted three sources of NYSE data. First, we consulted the NYSE's online directory of U.S. companies listing common stock. 11. The market capitalization of firms listed on the NYSE was $12.4 trillion, as compared to $3.5 trillion for firms listed on the NASDAQ 16. We treated a company as disclosing "material litigation" in Item 3 if it provided some specific information about at least one piece of litigation (against the firm, one of its subsidiaries, or one of its officers or directors), even if the company did not disclose all of the details required by Item 3, and even if the company also stated that it did not think the litigation was material. We did not treat a company as disclosing material litigation, however, if the disclosure was mere boilerplate (for example, "from time to time, the company is subject to a variety of claims involving X, Y, and Z"). In addition to material litigation, companies must disclose environmental proceedings and regulatory investigations. These, if they meet the requirement of specificity noted above, were counted even if the investigation had not led to the initiation of a formal proceeding against the company. If the company disclosed that a shareholder had presented to the company's board of directors a demand to bring suit, we did not treat this as material litigation unless the shareholder had already filed a derivative suit in court.
17. We construed "securities-related" broadly to include not just securities fraud suits, but also any investigations or actions initiated by the SEC (which include actions brought under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act), corporate law breach of fiduciary duty suits, litigation challenging a merger or acquisition, and shareholder derivative litigation. We did not treat ERISA matters as securities-related. Cases involving insurance presented a challenge, as some but not all insurance products have an investment component and have been treated as securities by the SEC. We treated as securities-related insurance matters that involved variable annuities, indexed annuities, and other "nontraditional" insurance products. Matters that were focused primarily on traditional fixed insurance products, or on the marketing of insurance generally (such as state investigations into contingent commissions and "bid rigging" in the insurance industry) were not treated as securities-related.
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" Whether a securities-related federal regulatory investigation or action is disclosed, 18 and if so, the identity of said regulator(s); " Whether a securities-related state regulatory investigation or action is disclosed, 19 and if so, the identity of the responsible state(s), and the topic of the investigation(s) or action(s); and 0 If a securities-related state regulatory investigation or action is disclosed and a securities-related class action, derivative action, or securities-related federal regulatory investigation or action is disclosed, whether they are related.
The dataset we created is comprehensive and provides a great deal of useful information about the litigation experiences of an important group of public companies. However, it has certain limitations that should be acknowledged at the outset. First, it leaves out certain categories of companies. We chose to look at the litigation experiences of all U.S. companies that traded common stock on the NYSE at some 2 1 Foreign firms and firms that traded only securities other than common stock on the NYSE from 2000-2010 were likewise excluded from the analysis. And because we examined only the litigation experiences of U.S. companies that traded common stock on the NYSE at some point between 2000 and 2010, firms that traded exclusively on the NASDAQ or another exchange during that time period were also excluded from the analysis. The litigation experiences of the firms excluded from the dataset may differ from those of the firms we analyzed.
Second 
2013]
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
Ks filed by the same set of companies in a different period. Third, it is important to note that Item 3 disclosures cannot provide a perfect picture of the litigation experiences of the companies in the dataset. For one thing, the Item 3 disclosure obligation is subject to a "materiality" standard. The SEC has provided some guidance on the type of litigation that firms should treat as material. For example, firms are instructed that they need not include information about litigation involving "primarily a claim for damages" if the amount involved does not exceed 10% of the company's current assets.
2 3 But the concept of materiality remains hazy and subject to interpretation, and companies seeking to avoid the release of negative information may interpret it in a self-serving way-at the very least, companies are likely to interpret the materiality standard in nonuniform ways. 24 In addition, some companies may voluntarily disclose information about legal proceedings even if they consider them immaterial, whereas other companies may not.
To gauge the quality and consistency of the Item 3 disclosures by the companies in our dataset, we compared our results with the database of federal securities class actions maintained by the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. The Stanford database indicates that federal securities class actions were filed against a total of 215 NYSE listed firms in the years [2004] [2005] [2006] . Of these 215 firms, 176 are in our dataset (not all are in our dataset because some failed to meet our criteria for inclusion-for example, they were foreign, or did not file Form 10-Ks in any of the years 2004, 2005, or 2006.) . Of the 176 firms in our dataset, 169 filed Form 10-Ks in the year the Stanford database indicates a federal securities class action was filed against them. We recorded 157 of these 169 firms as having disclosed a securities-related class action in that year-indicating a disclosure rate of 92.9%.25 23. See supra note 5, Instruction 2. It is unlikely that actions brought by state regulators would be treated as involving "primarily" a claim for "damages." First, if states sought a monetary recovery it would be a fine or penalty, not "damages." See supra note 19. Second, a final order by a state securities commissioner or like state agency finding a securities law violation can have serious collateral consequences for a firm. For example, it may limit the firm's ability to participate in certain exempt securities offerings. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. 224, 231-32 (1988) (defining information as material if a "reasonable investor" would consider it significant in making an investment decision).
25. The actual disclosure rate is arguably even higher, at 94.67% (160/169). This is because three of the twelve companies we did not record as having disclosed a securities class action in their Form 10-K in the same year as the Stanford database in fact made disclosures [Vol. 65
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Finally, it is important to note that Item 3 asks companies to disclose material litigation proceedings to which they are subject, as well as to include "similar information as to any such proceedings known to be contemplated by governmental authorities." When considering the results of our data analysis, one should keep this in mind. What we count as a federal or state regulatory matter may involve nothing more than a subpoena or request for information from the company that never amounts to a formal prosecution.
27
In addition to the foregoing company information culled from the Form 10-Ks, we collected a variety of census data related to each of the fifty states. We also determined whether the primary securities enforcer in each state was appointed or elected 8
B. Descriptive Statistics on Companies in Dataset
The data collection process described above resulted in the identification of 1,977 distinct companies and the examination of 5,441 Form 10-Ks. The number of Form 10-Ks we examined is less than three times the number of companies, because not all companies filed Form likely referencing the securities class action, but due to vagueness we did not record them as class actions.
26. See supra note 5 (emphasis added). 27. A recent decision clarifies, however, that companies are required to disclose regulatory investigations only when they "mature[] to a point where litigation is apparent and substantially certain to occur." Richman v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86556, *21 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
28. If the department or agency primarily responsible for enforcing the state's securities laws is headed by an elected (appointed) official, we treat the securities regulator as elected (appointed). California, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Virginia presented special cases. The California Department of Corporations, headed by an appointed official, has historically had primary responsibility for enforcing California's securities laws; California's elected attorney general could step in only upon referral by the Department of Corporations. In October 2003, however, a law was enacted giving the California attorney general broad concurrent authority to enforce the state's securities laws. See Nicholas Campins, A New Paradigm for Securities Regulation in California: Senate Bill 434 and its Implications (unpublished student paper, National State Attorneys General Program, Columbia University), https://www.law.columbia .edu/centerprogram/ag/resources/studentpapers. We therefore treat California as a state with an elected securities regulator. We also classified Connecticut as a state with an elected securities enforcer although its appointed banking commissioner has primary formal responsibility for enforcing the state's securities laws. We did so because 90% of the securities-related enforcement actions Connecticut was disclosed to have brought involved not its banking commissioner but instead its elected attorney general. With respect to no other state did a majority of the disclosed securities-related enforcement actions involve an elected (appointed) state regulator when the state regulator with formal primary authority over securities enforcement was appointed (elected). New Hampshire and Virginia were special cases because the securities regulators in those states are "elected" by the state legislature rather than appointed by the state governor; we believe it is appropriate to group them in the appointed category because the regulators are not directly exposed to popular election. The elected or appointed status of each state's securities regulator is reported infra at Table 6. 10-Ks in each of the three years examined. 29 31 Texas, New York, and California dominate here, with Texas taking first-home to the principal executive offices of 12% of the companies in our dataset.
As reported in Table A .5, roughly 30% of the companies in our dataset disclosed that their principal executive offices were located in their state of incorporation. If companies incorporated in Delaware are excluded, the number jumps to nearly 70%. This means that nearly 70% of companies not incorporated in Delaware were incorporated in the state where their principal executive offices were located. Where were those companies in the dataset with their principal executive offices in their states of incorporation located? Table A.6 shows the percentage of companies that disclosed each state as both the state of their principal executive offices and incorporation. 32 Ohio tops the list, home to 10% of this group of companies. Table A.8 reports on the subset of companies disclosing states different from their state of incorporation as the location of their principal executive offices. Specifically, it shows the percentage of these companies incorporated in each state. 33 29. A variety of reasons could explain this. For example, a company that filed a 10-K in one of the years of interest might have ceased to exist in the subsequent year (because it was acquired, or because it went bankrupt). A company might also have escaped any obligation to file a 10-K by losing its public company status ("going dark"). See supra note 7 for the ways in which a company can do this. It is also possible that a company filed fewer than three reports because it went public for the first time in 2005 or 2006. 30. To compute these percentages, we totaled the number of times the state was identified as a state of incorporation in the 5,441 Form 10-Ks examined and divided by 5,441. Year-byyear results are reported in the appendix at Table A.2. 31. To compute these percentages, we totaled the number of times the state was identified as the location of a company's principal executive offices in the 5,441 Form 10-Ks examined and divided by 5,441. Year-by-year results are reported in the appendix at Table A.4. 32. To compute these percentages, we totaled the number of times the state was identified as the location of both a company's principal executive offices and state of incorporation in the 5,441 Form 10-Ks examined and divided by the total number of Form 10-Ks disclosing the same state as the location of a company's principal executive offices and state of incorporation. Year-by-year results are reported in the appendix at Our review of the Item 3 disclosures by the companies in our dataset strongly supports the claim that U.S. public companies face significant litigation risk, and in particular securities litigation risk--often at the hands of multiple different enforcers. This Part describes the crowded litigation landscape painted by our data. Table 1 , Column A, shows the percentage of companies in the dataset that disclosed, in at least one of their examined Form 10-Ks, each type of litigation for which we recorded data (year-by-year results are reported in the Appendix at Table A .10.) . Striking is the fact that 72% of companies disclosed some form of material litigation over the course of the three-year period examined, and more than a quarter disclosed some form of securities litigation-with approximately two in every ten disclosing a securities class action. 34 Column B reports on the subset of companies disclosing material litigation and Column C reports on the smaller subset disclosing securities litigation. Whereas 27% of all companies disclosed some form of securities litigation, 38% of the subset of companies that disclosed material litigation also disclosed some form of securities litigation. Of the smaller subset disclosing securities litigation, 74% disclosed a securities class action, 48% disclosed a derivative action, 45% disclosed a securities-related federal regulatory investigation or action, and 8% disclosed a securities-related as the location of a company's state of incorporation but not its principal executive offices in the 5,441 Form 10-Ks examined and divided by the total number of reports disclosing a state of incorporation different than the location of a 'company's principal executive offices. Year-byyear results are reported in the appendix at Table A.9. 34. A total of 399 of the 1,977 firms in our dataset disclosed a securities class action in at least one of their reports (20.18%). We did not track whether the disclosed securities class action was brought under federal or state law. According to our search of the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse database, however, at least 255 of these 399 firms had a federal securities class action filed against them in the 2002-2006 timeframeapproximately 64%. The percentage of the 399 firms disclosing a federal securities class action is likely higher, however, for two reasons. First, the Stanford database only allowed us to sort for firms listed on the NYSE in the year the complaint was filed, whereas our dataset includes all firms that were listed on the NYSE at any point in 2000-2010 (if they met our other criteria for inclusion). Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, http://securities.stanford.edu. Second, some of the firms in our dataset may have been reporting on federal securities class actions filed prior to 2002. See supra note 12. Even taking this into account, however, our data suggests a nontrivial amount of state securities class action litigation took place in this time period, a finding that is consistent with other empirical studies. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 25 Fig. 1 Table 2 shows how often companies in the dataset disclosing securities litigation disclosed multiple different forms of securities litigation over the span of the three-year period examined. 35 Well over half disclosed facing securities litigation at the hands of at least two different types of enforcers, and well over a quarter disclosed facing securities litigation at the hands of at least three. Table 2 also shows how often companies that disclosed being the target of a securitiesrelated state regulatory investigation or action disclosed multiple different forms of securities litigation over the span of the three-year period. The rates are dramatically higher for this subgroup-nearly all disclosed facing securities litigation at the hands of multiple enforcers.
35. The forms we tracked are (1) class action, (2) derivative action, (3) federal regulatory investigation or action, and (4) state regulatory investigation or action. Table 3 focuses on the 243 companies that disclosed being the target of one or more securities-related federal regulatory investigations or actions, reporting how often these companies identified various federal regulators as being involved. The SEC was the dominant federal regulator, involved 98% of the time. Of the 238 companies in our dataset that disclosed being the target of an SEC investigation or action, ninety-four-nearly 40%-reported that they were also targeted by at least one other public or quasi-public federal regulator, such as the DOJ or the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).
III. STATE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
Though states retain significant enforcement authority, their role in securities regulation is relatively limited today. The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA) broadly preempted state authority to regulate the offering of "covered securities"-which include securities traded on national exchanges-as well as the ongoing disclosure obligations of the firms issuing them. 36 In connection with NSMIA's adoption, the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference described dual state-federal securities regulation as "redundant, costly, and ineffective," and noted testimony that it "tends to raise the cost of capital to American issuers of securities without providing commensurate protection to investors or to our markets." 37 Through its preemption provisions, NSMIA sought "to firmly ensconce the SEC as 'the exclusive regulator of national offerings of securities.' 38 Two years after NSMIA's adoption, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), 39 which precluded most state law fraud class actions involving "covered 36. NSMIA provides that: no law, rule, regulation, or order, or other administrative action of any State or any political subdivision thereof-(1) requiring, or with respect to, registration or qualification of securities, or registration or qualification of securities transactions, shall directly or indirectly apply to a security that-(A) is a covered security; or (B) will be a covered security upon completion of the transaction; (2) shall directly or indirectly prohibit, limit, or impose any conditions upon the use of-(A) with respect to a covered security..., any offering document that is prepared by or on behalf of the issuer; or (B) any proxy statement, report to shareholders, or other disclosure document relating to a covered security or the issuer thereof that is required to be and is filed with the Commission or any national securities organization registered under section 78o-3 of this title, except that this subparagraph does not apply to the laws, rules, regulations, or orders, or other administrative actions of the State of incorporation of the issuer; or (3) shall directly or indirectly prohibit, limit, or impose conditions, based on the merits of such offering or issuer, upon the offer or sale of any security described in paragraph (1).
15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (2006).
37. H.R. REP. No. 104-864, at 39 (1996) . 38. Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil. State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOKLYN L. REv. 117, 125 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 16 (1996) LAW § 63 (2012) . Prosecutions under the Act require no showing of scienter or intent to defraud, and its use of the term "fraud" and "fraudulent practices" is read to "include all deceitful practices contrary to the plain rules of common honesty." People v. Cadplaz Sponsors, Inc., 330 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432 (1972) .
44. The analyst research scandal involved alleged conflicts of interest between brokerage firms' investment banking and securities research arms. Specifically, these firms were alleged to have disseminated biased research that favored their investment banking clients and helped to attract future underwriting business. Eliot Spitzer, acting as NYAG, is widely credited with bringing the scandal to the public's attention in 2002, though the SEC had been actively studying the problem of analyst conflicts of interest and appropriate regulatory responses since [Vol. 65
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deterrence at a time when the SEC was asleep at the switch; others criticized his actions as politically motivated and ultimately harmful to the U.S. capital markets. 4 The New York Attorney General's office continues to make controversial enforcement decisions, provoking calls for reform by industry groups. 4 7 For example, during his recent stint as New York Attorney General, Andrew Cuomo grabbed headlines by filing a lawsuit against Bank of America for fraud in connection with its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, notwithstanding that the SEC had already taken related action against the firm. 48 He also opened investigations into the adequacy of disclosures by investment banks that sold mortgage-backed securities, a topic that has likewise gained the attention of the SEC and DOJ. One thing the ongoing debate over the efficacy of NSMIA's fraud carve-out has been missing is a more complete picture of the role state securities regulators have played in policing public companies. While we are generally aware of New York's activity, what-if anythinghave the rest of the states been doing? What type of public companies have they targeted, and for what sort of misconduct? Is there a political dimension to states' observed enforcement activity? In this Part, we report statistics generated by our data that shed light on these and other questions.
As reported in Table 4 , the companies in our dataset disclosed 102 distinct securities-related state regulatory investigations or actions, by which we mean unique company-state-topic combinations. 50 This understates the true number, because companies occasionally disclosed that they were responding to subpoenas and other requests for information from "state regulators," or that they had reached a settlement with "state regulators," without specifying these regulators' identities. When a company made such a disclosure, and we could not identify the specific states by reviewing the company's earlier or later public filings, we counted it only once for purposes of this tally and we did not attribute the action to any particular state. Also, occasionally a company listed a variety of states that were investigating multiple different matters, some securities-related and others not. 51 When this occurred and we could not disentangle the regulators by reviewing the company's earlier or later public filings, we counted each disclosed securities-related matter once for purposes of this tally and we did not attribute the action to any particular state. As a result, we did not attribute a total of twelve securities-related state regulatory matters to any state. Therefore, a total of ninety are attributable to a particular state. While slightly understated, these figures are clearly extremely small. As Table 5 shows, the average number of attributed securities-related state actions or investigations disclosed in the dataset on a per state basis is only 1.8; it drops to 1.2 if New York is excluded. And this covers a three-year time period. 5 1. For example, insurance companies sometimes lumped state investigations into their contingent commission arrangements together with investigations into their sale of "nontraditional" insurance products-allegedly sold to help companies cook their books. As explained supra in note 17, we treat the latter but not the former as "securities-related."
But as the standard deviations also reported in Table 5 suggest, there is considerable variation across states. Table 6 , which breaks down in descending order of prevalence the disclosed securities-related state matters attributable to each state, makes this variation apparent. As one might predict, New York tops the list as the most active state, responsible for 34% of these matters. More surprisingly, West Virginia comes in second with 16%. Connecticut and Massachusetts also have relatively strong showings, but the remaining forty-six states show much less activity-indeed, thirty-two states were not reported to have brought any securities-related enforcement actions or investigations against the companies in our dataset. 52 Table 6 also reports whether the primary securities regulator in each state is appointed or elected and, if elected, whether the regulator during the time frame examined was a Republican or a Democrat. 53 52. Of course, this does not mean that these states' securities regulators were not hard at work; the more appropriate inference is that they were directing their scarce resources to securities-related misconduct of a more local ilk. For example, states have played an important role in protecting elders from securities scams as well as in policing for fraud in the sale of unregistered securities. See N. Am. SEC. ADM'RS ASSOC. ENFORCEMENT SECTION, 2010 ENFORCEMENT REP. 2, available at http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/2010-Enforcement-Report.pdf (reporting that a majority of states' securities fraud cases "featured unregistered individuals selling unregistered securities").
53. If the party affiliation of the elected official with primary responsibility for enforcing a state's securities laws changed over the time period examined (2004) (2005) (2006) , we used the party of the enforcer that served during a majority of the time period. This was an issue with respect to only two states. In Delaware, a Republican stepped down as attorney general at the end of 2005 and was replaced with a Democrat (we thus treat Delaware as having a Republican enforcer); in Missouri, a Democrat was elected Secretary of State in November 2004 to replace a Republican (we thus treat Missouri as having a Democrat enforcer). Arizona is unique in that the regulator with primary securities enforcement authority is a popularly elected five-person commission; because all commissioners were Republican during the time period examined, we treat Arizona as having a Republican enforcer. 
0.0%
Elected state regulators differ from appointed state regulators in a variety of ways. They are directly accountable to voters. They must run a potentially costly campaign to obtain and retain their positions, an endeavor which may require them to seek contributions from various interest groups. Elected state regulators may be more likely to aspire to higher elected office than their appointed counterparts. Do the political forces that only elected enforcers confront lead to differences in enforcement behavior? Our data suggest they might. As demonstrated in [Vol. 65 During the time period we examined, the SEC and the Presidency were both controlled by Republicans. Did the enforcement behavior of states with an elected Democrat serving as the state securities regulator differ from the enforcement behavior of other states? Our data suggest that party affiliation may indeed have affected the enforcement behavior of elected state securities regulators. As reported in Table 8 , our data indicates that states with elected Democrats serving as their primary securities regulator were much more active in policing public companies for securities-related misconduct than their representation among all states, or even among the subset of states with elected enforcers, would predict. Specifically, 24% of states had an elected Democrat serving as the state securities regulator, yet these states were responsible for 78% of the total number of state regulatory matters attributable to particular states. Whereas 66% of the subset of states with an elected securities regulator had a Democrat serving in the position during the time period examined, states with elected Democrats were responsible for 97% of the state regulatory matters attributable to states with an elected regulator. States with an elected Democrat serving as securities regulator remain overrepresented even if we exclude New York. Any relationship between the elected status of a state's securities enforcer, or his status as an elected Democrat, and the level of a state's observed enforcement activity might, of course, be attributable to random chance. It might also disappear if other state characteristics likely to impact enforcement intensity are taken into account. Such characteristics might include population, as states with larger populations internalize a larger portion of the harm caused by public companies' securities-related misconduct, and thus might invest more in deterrence. Per capita government expenditures might also influence enforcement intensity; states that spend more likely devote more resources to securities enforcement vis-A-vis all companies, including public companies. The level of a state's enforcement activity might also change with the number of public companies headquartered in the state, or the percentage of state GDP attributable to the financial sector, though it is difficult to know in which directions these particular factors will cut. 55 55. The number of public companies headquartered in a state might bear a positive relationship to the level of a state's enforcement activity, if being home to public companies makes a state more sensitive to the cost of capital, and if greater enforcement helps reduce the cost of capital (by, for example, increasing investors' confidence in company disclosures). Similarly, the dependence of a state's economy on the financial sector might bear a positive relationship to the level of a state's enforcement activity, if greater enforcement benefits the financial sector (by, for example, increasing confidence in the markets and hence the number of financial transactions). Conversely, both factors might bear a negative relationship to enforcement activity if they increase the likelihood that a state is "captured" by managerial interests who prefer lax enforcement, or if greater enforcement is not in fact beneficial in the ways assumed above.
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We ran regressions to account for these possibilities. We selected a negative binomial model because our variable of interest is overdispersed count data, specifically the number of state actions and investigations brought by each state. 56 In our first regression, the independent variables were: (1) whether the state enforcer was elected rather than appointed; 57 (2) the log of the state population; 58 (3) state general expenditures per capita; 59 (4) the number of companies in our dataset headquartered in the state; 60 and (5) the percentage of state GDP attributable to the financial sector. 61 The results, reported in the Appendix at Table A . 12, show a statistically significant relationship between the elected status of a state's enforcer and the number of enforcement actions and investigations brought by the state. No other independent variable had a statistically significant impact. The coefficients in a negative binomial regression are difficult to interpret, as they represent the difference in the logs of expected counts of the dependent variable given a change in the particular independent variable to which the coefficient attaches. 62 It is therefore useful to convert the coefficients into incident rate ratios (IRRs). In this regression, the IRR for the elected state enforcer independent variable was 4.26. This means 56. See, e.g., A.C. CAMERON AND P.K. TRIVEDI, REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COUNT DATA 70-71 (1998) . This model fit better than alternatives we tried, including Poisson. The p-value for the chi-square was 0.0321 in the first regression discussed in the text and 0.0071 in the second, suggesting that in both cases the model as a whole was statistically significant.
57. See supra note 28; supra Table 6 . 62. In a negative binomial regression, "the dependent variable is a count variable that is either over-or under-dispersed, and the model models the log of the expected count as a function of the predictor variables." State Annotated Output Negative Binomial Regression, UCLA ACAD. TECH. SERVS., http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/stata-nbreg output.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2012) . that states with an elected securities regulator brought enforcement actions and investigations at a rate more than four times that of states with an appointed securities regulator, holding the other variables in the model constant. 63 We ran a second regression to explore the relationship between partisan affiliation and enforcement behavior. In this regression we used the same variables as in the first, except we replaced the dummy variable "elected rather than appointed" with the dummy variable "elected and Democrat." 64 The results, reported in the Appendix at Table A . 13, show a highly statistically significant relationship between the status of a state's securities regulator as an elected Democrat and the number of actions and investigations brought by the state. The IRR for the elected Democrat independent variable was 6.84, meaning that states with elected Democrats serving as their securities regulator brought enforcement actions and investigations at a rate nearly seven times that of other states, holding the other variables in the model constant. 65 This finding is highly statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Again, no other independent variable displayed a statistically significant relationship to the number of enforcement actions brought. 6 V Another notable characteristic of the disclosed state actions and investigations concerns the frequency with which they overlapped with other enforcement efforts. As noted in Part II, nearly 100% of the companies that disclosed being the target of a state regulatory investigation or action reported being targeted by at least one other securities enforcer over the course of the three-year period examined (as compared to 56% for all companies disclosing some form of securities 63. These results persisted when New York was excluded as an outlier, except the model overall lost statistical significance.
64. Another approach would have been to include the political affiliation of the enforcer (Democrat or Republican) and the type of enforcer (appointed or elected) and create interaction variables. But assigning a political affiliation to appointed enforcers is an uncertain task. Should an appointed enforcer's personal political affiliation be referenced, or rather the political affiliation of the person or entity that appointed him? The former data is not consistently available, and is likely less relevant to enforcement behavior than the political affiliation of the appointing person or entity. But if the political affiliation of the appointing person or entity were used, the political affiliation variable would not have a consistent meaning across enforcer types. We had too few observations to run a meaningful regression focused only on the subset of states with elected enforcers.
65. It is possible that state securities regulators who are elected Democrats are always more active than securities regulators who are either elected Republicans or appointed, or it may be the case that they are more active when the SEC and the Presidency are controlled by Republicans-which was the case during the 2004-2006 time frame examined. Without data on state enforcement efforts during a time period when the SEC and the Presidency were controlled by Democrats, we cannot separate out these two possibilities.
66. Again, these results persisted when New York was excluded as an outlier, except the model overall lost statistical significance.
[Vol. 65 POLICING PUBLIC COMPANIES litigation). 67 As Table T.9 demonstrates, our review of these companies' disclosures reveals that they were targeted by at least one other securities enforcer with respect to the same or related misconduct a remarkable 93% of the time. They faced overlapping enforcement by public or quasi-public federal regulators 91% of the time and by private enforcers 67% of the time. SEC v. Greenburg, No. M-18-304 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2005) , available at http://www.sec.gov/ litigation/complaints/comp 19176.pdf (indicating that the SEC had "issued a formal order of investigation in the Matter of Certain Loss Mitigation Unit Insurance Products" in March 2001). Finite insurance (and reinsurance) limits substantially the loss the insurer (or reinsurer) can suffer. Typically, a corporation will pay a large premium likely to cover all losses into an account held with the insurer; "[i]f the cost of losses turns out to be less than the premium, the carrier gives back the difference to the insured; if the losses turn out to be greater, the insured pays an additional premium to the insurer." David M. Katz, Finite Insurance: Beyond the Scandals, CFO.coM (Apr. 14, 2005) , http://www3.cfo.com/article.cfm/3860547?currpage=0. Finite products thus can resemble a deposit-loan arrangement more than a true risk-shifting insurance transaction, but allow purchasers to utilize the different accounting treatment that applies to insurance. 71. An open-end mutual fund's investment advisor benefits when brokers successfully market fund shares, because the advisor's compensation is typically based on total fund assets under management-and fund assets grow as fund shares are sold. A mutual fund's investment advisor also generally controls which brokers the fund selects to effect commission-generating transactions in its underlying securities. Thus, a potential conflict of interest exists, as a fund's investment advisor may direct the fund's brokerage needs not based on what is in the best interest of the fund, but instead based on the efforts brokers have made to market the fund's shares. The investment advisor can also reward brokers for their marketing efforts in other ways J. 1241, 1247-67 (2008) . The SEC and NASD brought numerous enforcement actions against fund managers and brokers for failing to adequately disclose the basis upon which the funds' brokerage business was directed, [Vol. 65 related to one of the two mutual fund industry scandals just mentioned, but ambiguity in the disclosures made it impossible for us to determine which. The remaining 15% of the disclosed state regulatory investigations and actions involved other types of misconduct. This subset also involved a large degree of overlap with federal regulatory efforts (73%), but less than did the group of state regulatory matters overall (9 1%). he financial sector, a result that is not surprising given that the topics of most of the state regulatory matters concerned scandals that beset that sector. 72 
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CONCLUSIONS & EXTENSIONS
This Article substantiates the claim that U.S. public companies experience significant amounts of material litigation. In particular, they experience high levels of securities litigation-often at the hands of multiple different enforcers. Of the 1,977 public companies whose Form 10-Ks we reviewed, 72% disclosed some form of material litigation over the three-year period examined, and 27% disclosed some form of securities litigation. Well over half of the companies that disclosed securities litigation reported facing two or more different forms of securities litigation over the course of the three-year period examined, and nearly 30% reported facing three or more. Many of these companies were likely targeted by different securities law enforcers with respect to the same or related misconduct. We know, for example, that the subset of companies disclosing a securities-related state regulatory action or investigation were targeted by another securities law enforcer with respect to the same or related misconduct a remarkable 93% of the time.
These striking figures suggest it is worthwhile for policymakers to rethink the allocation of securities law enforcement authority in the United States-an allocation that currently has more to do with historical happenstance than thoughtful design choices. 74 Questions worthy of further exploration include: What value is added when multiple enforcers target public firms for the same misconduct? Do different securities enforcers vindicate different normative aspirations? When it comes to imposing sanctions on public companies for securities-related misconduct, the argument has been made that the only sensible goal is deterrence, whether the litigation takes the form of a civil regulatory action, a criminal prosecution, or a private class action lawsuit. 5 If this is the case, how does the use of multiple enforcers advance (or retard) the goal of optimal deterrence? One obvious response is that it guards against the underdeterrence that might arise should a single entity, such as the SEC, be granted an enforcement monopoly. But that answer is too facile, as it ignores the real costs that or incorporated within the state if the reporting company was headquartered or incorporated within the enforcing state or if the action related to a subsidiary of the reporting company that was headquartered or incorporated within the enforcing state.
74. See, e.g., Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform, supra note 1, at 1310-15 (discussing the historically contingent evolution of Rule lob-5 class action enforcement).
75. See, e.g., id at 1312-13 (discussing the consensus view that securities fraud class actions cannot be justified on compensatory grounds). A more nuanced version of this argument is that corporate sanctions can be justified as a means of deterring managers whose misbehavior is best viewed as a form of agency cost; holding the corporate entity (and, ultimately, its public shareholders) liable may aid in this endeavor if doing so produces information that allows shareholders to better discipline management. See Amanda M. Rose & Richard Squire, Intraporfolio Litigation, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1679 REV. , 1680 REV. -81 (2011 .
POLICING PUBLIC COMPANIES
76
can result from the use of multiple enforcers. Further thought should be given to whether there are more efficient ways to guard against underdeterrence.7
This Article also sheds light on what has heretofore been an empirical lacuna: the role played by state regulators in policing public companies for securities-related misconduct. Our data reveals that, at least in the time frame examined, state regulators were significantly less active than their private and federal counterparts. Most states were not identified as having brought any enforcement actions or investigations against the public companies in our dataset. The states that were so identified tended to target out-of-state firms (68%) and to focus their efforts on scandals that beset the financial industry and also caught the attention of other securities law enforcers. In 91% of the disclosed state matters, there was an overlapping federal action or investigation, and in 67% there was overlapping private litigation. This does not reveal whether the state actions were largely redundant, or whether they mostly added value-by, for example, first exposing misconduct that would have otherwise gone undetected. Further research, including a qualitative review of the state matters disclosed in our dataset, could help shed light on the social value of NSMIA's fraud carve-out, as well as provide insights into state regulatory behavior more broadly.
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One thing our analysis does make clear is that, at least in the time period examined, state securities enforcement activity against public firms was more likely if the state securities enforcer served in an elected position than if he served in an appointed position, and more likely still if the enforcer was an elected Democrat. The statistically significant results of our regressions show that these sets of enforcers brought enforcement actions and investigations at roughly four and seven times the rate, respectively, of other enforcers, when controlling for other variables likely to influence enforcement intensity. This raises interesting questions worthy of further reflection. Why are these enforcers more active? What do their unique incentives tell us about the likely social value of state enforcement? The SEC was deliberately designed to be a politically insulated independent administrative agency. 
